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FuTURE INrnREsTs-WoRTHIER T:rn.E DoCTRINE-Plaintiff created an irrevocable trust of $75,000, reserving the income to himself for life and directing distribution of the corpus upon his death to his heirs according to the California
laws of succession in e~stence at his death. Later he sued to terminate the trust
on the theory that since the worthier title doctrine prevented creation of a remainder in his heirs, he was sole beneficiary. The intermediate California appellate court held that the worthier title doctrine was inapplicable because of a
California statute changing the word "heirs" from one of limitation to one of purchase. Therefore, the outstanding remainder in the heirs prevented termination
of the trust.1 On appeal to the California Supreme Court, held, reversed. As a
matter of construction, when the settlor created a life estate in himself with a
limitation to his heirs he did not intend to create an interest in his heirs. Bixby
v. California Trust Co., (Cal. 1949) 202 P. (2d) 1018.
At common law one could not take by purchase what the law gave him by
descent, title by descent being the worthier title. 2 The doctrine, like the rule in
Shelley's case, was one of law, applied without regard to the intention of the
grantor. 3 Although the rule was abolished in England in 1833, it has survived
in the United States as a rule of construction and has been extended to trusts
of personal property. 4 American statutes abolishing the rule in Shelley's case have
generally been held to leave the worthier title doctrine unimpaired. 5 Nevertheless, the lower court in the principal case refused to terminate the trust, relying
chiefly on a California statute designed to eliminate the rule in Shelley's case6
and the broad scope attributed to the statute in an earlier California Supreme
Court decision. 7 The lower court's interpretation of the statute was adversely
Bixby v. California Trust Co., (Cal. App. 1948) 190 P. (2d) 321.
1 Co. Lrrr. 22b; 18 VrnEn's Ann., Remainder, (A); Bingham's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 91a,
76 Eng. Rep. 611 (1598-1600). See 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §144 (1936).
3 Pennick and Mitford's Case, 1 Leo. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 168 (1589). See note- 2, supra.
4 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919); Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929); Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. 169, 185 S. 897
(1938); Natl. Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 113 (1944); 1 SIMES,
FUTURE lNTBREsTs, §§146, 147 (1936); 3 PnoPERTY RBsTATBMENT, §314 (1940).
5 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919); Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala.
169, 185 S. 897 (1938); 1 SIMES, FuTURE INTERESTS, §148 (1936).
6 "When a remainder is limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a person to whom
a life estate in the same property is given, the persons who, on the termination of the life
estate, are the successors or heirs of the body of the owner for life, are entitled to take by
virtue of the remainder so limited to them, and not as mere successors of the owner fo_r life."
Cal. Civ. Code (1941) §779. Cf. N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) §54, construed in Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
7 Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1915)." In that case the court
refused termination of a trust by a settlor who had retained a life estate with remainder to
"her heirs at law, according to the laws of succession of the state of California as such laws
now exist." (Italics supplied.) The statement in the Gray case was dictum since the worthier
title doctrine has no application where the grantor specifies a class of remaindermen which
might differ from his heirs at law. Thompson v. Batts, 168 N.C. 333, 84 S.E. 347 (1915);
Boone v. Baird, 91 Miss. 420, 44 S. 929 (1907). See explanation of the Gray case in the
principal case at 1020, and in 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §147, n. 22 (1936). The concurring opinion in the principal case suggests that the Gray case should be overruled.
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criticized in the Michigan Law Review as unwise judicial legislation. 8 It was
there urged that the worthier title doctrine as a rule of construction does not serve
to defeat the intention of the grantor as does the rule in Shelley's case, but probably supports it. Since the statute would not literally effect a total abolition of
the worthier title doctrine, its uncertain scope would tend to create unfortunate
confusion. 9 In reversing the lower court's interpretation, the California Supreme
Court mentions neither the statute nor the reasoning of the lower court. The
decision is placed squarely on the rule of construction that no remainder interests
are created by a trust in which the settlor reserves a life estate in himself and provides that on his death the corpus shall be distributed to his heirs. The court
states that this result carries out the usual intention of the settlor, and is in accord
with the general policy in favor of free alienability of property. It is clear, at least,
that the holding is in accord with the general effect of the worthier title doctrine
in the United States.
David H. Armstrong, S. Ed.

8 46 MxcH. L. REv. 991 (1948).
9 For example, the statute could have no application where granter gave a life estate to
X with remainder to the heirs of the granter. See note 6, supra.

